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Abstract: 
Digital technologies are often said (1) to enable a qualitatively new engagement with already 
existing cultural materials (for example through sampling and adaptation), and (2) to offer a 
new disintermediated distribution channel to the creator. From a review of secondary data on 
music artists’ earnings and seven in-depth interviews, it appears that both ambitions have 
remained, until now, largely unfulfilled. The paper discusses to what extent the structure of 
copyright law is to blame, and sets out a research agenda. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The relationship of the artist to the market, mediated by transferable copyrights, has evolved in 
several phases. Up to the 18th century, copyright was typically practiced as the one-off sale of 
an original manuscript to a market intermediary (stationer/publisher or performing 
entrepreneur/patron). Subsequent exploitation of a work, often very shortlived, was left to the 
discretion of the new owner. No royalties were payable.  
 
Early statutory copyright terms were short. Under the English Statute of Anne of 1710, 
protection was granted for 14 years from publication (renewable once), and limited to reprints 
of books or other writings. With England as the trend setter, the subject matter of copyright 
soon embraced engravings (1735), music (1777), fabric designs (1787) and sculptures (1798). 
 
During the 19th century, the copyright term began to be measured from the life span of the 
authors and their immediate heirs. Post mortem auctoris terms were introduced for example 
with the author laws of the French revolution (1791; 1793), the Prussian Act for the protection 
of property in works of science and the arts (1837) and Talfourd’s copyright act in the UK 
(1842).  
 
In negotiations with authors, publishers gratefully accepted these extended terms of protection 
and explored prolonged exploitations in the market, such as repeat performances. Royalty 
contracts became common in music and print publishing. 
 
The shape of Western copyright was settled with the Berne Convention of 1886, and integrated 
into the global free trade area with the WTO TRIPS Agreement of 1994. The regime combines 
a nod to the creator -- exemplified by a term of protection derived from the author’s life -- with 
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the economic structure of transferable property rights, creating a market for cultural 
productions. Thus the application of copyright in the contractual relations of music and media 
arts (despite any author driven rhetoric), always has been a function of the bargaining power of 
market intermediaries. 
 
The 20th century was characterised by a shift towards multi-channel exploitation of works, for 
example through recordings, films, broadcasts, advertising. What used to be secondary 
exploitation turned into the dominant intermediating activity. New technologies of exploitation 
often led to a concomitant change in the range of infringing activities under copyright law. 
Adaptation, translation, recording and broadcasting all became exclusive to the right owner. 
 
At the end of the 20th century, music production and consumption dramatically embraced 
digital technologies. In 1982, the ‘music instrument digital interface’ (MIDI) was introduced, 
revolutionising music production. Within a decade, professional recordings could be assembled 
in widely affordable home studios. In 1983, the CD came to the market as the first digital mass 
consumer product. In 1994, Netscape’s Navigator browser was released, initiating rapid 
worldwide Internet adoption. The MP3 compression standard (1994) and peer-to-peer 
technologies such as Napster (1999) turned the Internet into a music distribution medium. 
 
These technological developments may appear to have two main copyright potentialities: 
 
• Digitisation enables a more extensive engagement with already existing artefacts (for 
example through sampling and adaptation), and may break down the traditional copyright 
barrier between creator and user. 
• Digitisation offers a new disintermediated distribution channel which may affect the 
bargaining power between creator and existing market intermediaries (and thus the structure 
of copyright contracting). 
 
This paper aims to assess to whether these possibilities have been realised – and if not, why not.  
 
 
 
Methodology 
 
Definitions: 
‘Music and media arts’ for the purposes of this study was defined as any artefact that can be 
delivered digitally as strings of 1s and 0s where sound is an essential and dominant feature of 
the receptive experience. This definition allows for the inclusion of words or pictures (i.e. 
multimedia music works), but music videos, video installations, computer games, radio plays 
are not the primary focus of the study. 
 
The term ‘artist’ is used to cover a contemporary creative role that may include three legally 
distinct activities: composition, production and performance of sounds. 
 
These definitions are adopted for working purposes only. The first definition narrows the 
category of artefacts sufficiently to ensure historic comparability of music industry data. The 
second definition widens the traditional conception of music creation by pooling the legal 
categories ‘author of musical work’, ‘producer of sound recording’ and ‘performer’ to capture 
contemporary artistic practices. 
 
 
Data collection: 
Three methods of data collection were used: 
 
(A) Desk research, reviewing existing quantitative data on artists’ earnings in music and media 
arts. 
 
(B) Visits to industry events, such as trade fairs, policy symposia, and professional 
development seminars, to scope current issues and explore views of leading members of 
copyright organisations (Collecting Societies; Music Publishers; Record Labels). Six such 
events were attended in 2003. 
 
(C) In depths interviews with a selection of artists.  
 
The focus was on the UK, with German data used as a complement.  
 
It was expected that methods (A) and (B) would generate artist profiles and an interview 
protocol as the basis for in depths interviews (C).  
 
Initially, it was planned to interview artists according to five types, covering  
1. independent, commercial unsigned artist with local live event following 
2. artist entirely dependent on the subsidised arts sector 
3. established artist whose work substantially relies on re-using other people’s work  
4. media artist with substantial royalty income from performance of her work on TV etc 
5. cultural icon whose work is frequently sampled or adapted by other artists 
 
However, discussions with copyright societies, labels and publishers indicated that it was 
difficult to validate these artist profiles as typical. It was claimed: ‘each artist is different’, and 
‘no two income streams are the same’. Within the time and resource constraints of a pilot study, 
no survey could be carried out. 
 
It was therefore decided not to concentrate on artist profiles as representative of the population 
of music and media artists. Rather, the selection of artists aimed to capture experiences that 
reflected the impact of digital technologies. The review of artists’ earnings data (Method A) 
was important in providing a context in which to generalise from these individual experiences.  
 
Eight artists were interviewed in November, December 2003 and May 2004 in Germany and 
the UK. Four interviews were conducted in person, four on the telephone,  each lasting about 1 
to 1 1/2 hours. Notes were taken and written up within 24 hours. 
 
The artists were (self-definitions): 
- Rock artist, also running label and publishing company 
- Session musician with songwriting credits 
- Dance and ‘library music’ artist 
- Electronica artist and DJ (many samples, 3 top ten singles)  
- Electronic music artist (contemporary ‘classical’) 
- Techno jazz artist, also running production, label and publishing company 
- DJ and producer (crossover techno/contemporary) 
- Film and media composer, also active in copyright society 
 
All interviewees are mid-level entrepreneurial artists, i.e. they succeed in making a full time 
living from music. 
 
 
Interview protocol: 
1. Artist earnings 
What are artists’ income streams, incl. percentage from copyright (royalty) and non-copyright 
(live, media, teaching) sources? 
 
2. Digital distribution technologies  
Is Internet distribution benefiting independent and niche repertoire? What are the obstacles to 
self-publishing, self-distribution? 
 
3. Transformative use 
What are artists’ experiences in using material claimed by third parties (e.g. sampling, bootleg 
tracks)? 
 
4. Non-copyright consumption practices 
What are artists’ perceptions of P2P services, pirate radio, unlicensed clubs? 
 
 
 
Results: Markets in creative industries 
 
The arts show an oversupply of creative ambitions (Hirsch 1972; Peterson & Berger 1975) 
combined with curious ‘winner-take-all’ demand patterns (Frank & Cook 1995; Kretschmer et 
al. 1999). This has two main effects on copyright contracting.  
 
(1) Since many more products want to enter the market than can be consumed, there is an 
important role for the commercial intermediary, acting as selector or gate keeper. In the music 
industry, publishers, record companies, broadcasters or clubs can play this role for different 
markets.  The bargaining power of artists early in their career is therefore weak. 
 
(2) Despite ever more sophisticated marketing efforts, commercial intermediaries have been 
unable to reliably predict demand patterns. Nobody knows the next hit. Only about one in ten 
releases will repay its initial investment (Goldberg 2000; Kretschmer et al. 2001). Market 
intermediaries tend to favour known artists with a track record. The bargaining power of 
consistently successful artists is therefore very high.   
 
 
Only two reliable large scale studies of artists’ earnings were identified: (a) an analysis of 
royalty distributions of the British collecting society PRS published by the Monopolies & 
Merger Commission (now Competition Commission) in 1996 (Performing Rights. London: 
HMSO Cm 3147) and (b) a German analysis of artists’ insurance data for the federal ministry of 
employment in 2000 (Bericht der Bundesregierung über die soziale Lage der Künstlerinnen 
und Künstler in Deutschland). See Appendix for a summary of data. 
 
In 1994 (MMC 1996), 1438 UK composers and lyricists (of a total of 15,500 writers) received 
more than £2500 from performing royalties (for broadcasts and public performances). 10 
composers received more than £100,000. (In addition to performing royalties, composers can 
expect to earn a similar amount from mechanical royalties for the sale of sound recordings).  
 
 
1994 PRS income distribution (15,500 writer members) 
source: MMC 1996 
 
10 composers more than £100,000.  
204 more than £20,000 
459 more than £10,000 
848 more than £5,000 
 
8,237 under £100 
 
------ 
1998-2000 PRS income distribution (30,000 writer members) 
source: annual reports 
 
200 more than £100,000 
700 more than £25,000 
1,500 more than £10,000 
2,300 more than £5,000 
 
16,000 under £100 
 
 
 
The average annual earnings for a German composer in 1998 (total in Künstlersozialkasse: 
3717) were in the region of DM 22,000 (~EURO 11,000). About 90% of musicians (total in 
Künstlersozialkasse: 26,545*) earned below DM 30,000 (~EURO 15,000). 2650 musicians 
earned above DM 30,000, with 125 musicians earning above DM 102,000 (~EURO 51,000). 
 
The MMC PRS study only captures copyright income while the German data includes income 
from non-copyright sources, such as teaching or media work. However, the results of both 
studies broadly match with a number of smaller artists’ surveys. For example, the UK Society 
of Authors survey (Poole 2000) to which 1711 members responded revealed average earnings 
of £16,600 per annum. 75% earned under £20,000, 61% under 10,000 and 46% under £5,000. 
According to a GEMA (German collecting society) insider, only about 1,200 German 
composers can live from their creative output (Dümling 2003, p. 313; citing Wahren 1995). 
 
Only a small minority of artists reaches ordinary living standards from copyright income. 
 
A questionnaire survey of Austrian composers’ earnings by a group of sociologists from the 
Vienna Hochschule für Musik und Darstellende Kunst (now Musikuniversität), delivered the 
following income profiles (Komponistenreport, 1993): 
 
630 questionnaires, 283 returns, average age 37 years: 
 
Income from compositions as percentage of total income 
below 10%: 36.8% 
10-20%: 31.2% 
21-49%: 14.1% 
50% and more: 17.8% 
 
   
 
Most composers received also income from 
other musical activity (performance & teaching): 82.0%
non-music professional activity: 25.6%
family members: 18.2%
charity: 3.9%
capital: 1.1%
other sources: 3.5%
             
                                                 
* Figures for the distribution of earnings were only available for an aggregate of all musicians. See Appendix. 
        
It is well-known that in the UK, the social benefit system plays an important part in the early 
stages and gap periods of artistic career. Our interviews confirmed this. 
 
Earnings from non-copyright, and even non-artistic activities are an important source of income 
for most creators. 
 
 
Two arguments can be made why the 90:10 distribution of copyright earnings still represents 
effective support for the creative basis of society. Both arguments are doubtful. 
 
(a) The market picks the winner. Copyright supports the best segments of culture. 
 
Products accounting for the top 10% segment include blatantly industrial products (such as 
singles tied in to populist TV shows), but also cultural classics (such as the Beatles). It is 
evident that much that is culturally worthwhile is not, and will never reach this Top 10 segment. 
Diversity of cultural production, and support for niche communities is not a major effect of 
copyright. 
 
(b) Artists are risk takers. Without the prospects of potential top 10% earnings, nobody would 
become an artist. 
 
This argument warrants closer empirical attention. It is unlikely that production in the lower 
earning segments would cease without the incentive of possible top earnings, in particular if 
non-copyright support was available, such as grants or benefits. However, the prospect of 
financial success appears to be a significant motivation. 
 
 
 
The rationale of artists’ contracts 
 
Most artists’ earnings formally involve the sale or licensing of copyright (often structured as 
advances plus royalty entitlements).  However, it is difficult to determine precisely the role of 
rights in the generation and distribution of artists’ income. Contractual transactions may 
emulate the effects of copyright, as they do for sport stars (who do not legally own their 
performances). 
 
To give an example: A film composer may receive £5,000  for the delivery of a sound track to a 
television series. This may be divided into an author’s fee and a production fee. Additionally 
the composer may receive performing royalties via a writer collecting society (PRS) for each 
broadcast on TV, royalties from a performers’ collecting society if the composer conducts 
(performs) his/her own score (PAMRA), and mechanical royalties via MCPS if a soundtrack is 
released. 
 
Without the existence of copyright, the composer may still be commissioned for delivery of a 
soundtrack, just as a footballer is paid to play football. Similarly, the composer may 
contractually receive royalties, just as the footballer may receive a bonus for winning a title, or 
making an agreed number of appearances.  
 
In a market transaction, the contracting parties should normally agree only a royalty deal (rather 
than a one-off flat fee) if there are benefits from risk-sharing or benefits from the artist’s 
continued association with his/her works, in enhancing the work’s reputation by supporting 
promotional efforts and giving performances (cf. Towse, 2001).  
 
However, the institutional structure of copyright societies has historically led to advantageously 
structured royalty terms. Composers receive a greater share of income than the market would 
allocate to them. For example, in Germany the collectively negotiated pay-per-play 
performance fee received by performing right society GEMA is split 2/3 : 1/3 in favour of the 
composer (mechanicals 60:40). Under PRS statutes, the upper limit for the publishers’ share is 
50%.  As one would expect from economic premises, there is increasing pressure by more 
powerful actors, such as advertising agencies and broadcasters, to capture valuable copyright 
royalties by setting up their own publishing companies. These new music publishers do not 
promote the music they sign but act simply as a legal vehicle for receiving royalties. Mol & 
Wijnberg (2004, forthcoming) term this trend ‘value chain envy’. 
 
Royalty terms for performers are less advantageous, and much closer to actual bargaining 
powers. Traditional recording contracts were for extended exclusive periods. Over the last 
decade, record companies tied artists with a combination of advances and options which could 
be unilaterally exercised by the label. Since advances paid are recoupable from production, 
video and promotion expenses (often exceeding $500,000), most artists up to sales of 200,000 
copies, appear never to receive any royalties for their performances. As one interviewee said: 
‘the majors don’t want you to stop working’. 
 
Several interviewees made more money selling only a few thousand records via local vinyl 
retailers or concerts, than from earlier recording contracts.   
 
 
Results: Views of the digital environment 
 
All the artist careers we engaged with in our interviews were affected by the revolution in 
media production associated with digital equipment. Since the late 1980s, professional studios 
were affordable with countless possibilities for sampling, manipulating and mixing sounds. In 
1991, one artist said he had spent £7,000 for his first home studio. Some of our interviewees 
entered the market at that time, exploring new genres such as house, acid, jungle or trance. The 
distinctions between composer, performer and producer became increasingly blurred. 
 
 
(a) sampling 
For all our interviewees, creative engagement with contemporary cultural materials, arguably a 
core potential of digital technologies, was prevalent. However, this had been hindered through 
highly bureaucratic and costly processes of sample clearance. For example, if an artist wants to 
include a sample from another record, major right holders often insist on a controlling interest 
of 50% to 100% of the rights in the new track. EMI demands that these rights are preserved 
even in future remixes where the original sample may no longer be recognisable (Music 
Publisher Association contract seminar 13/11/2003). Remixes of whole songs typically require 
assignment of 100% of the rights in the new (adapted) track. 
 
One interviewee thought it was best not to clear a sample if only 1000-2000 records would be 
sold, and risk ‘cease and desist’ letters. Another argued for a system of compulsory licensing, 
with fees of $250 per sample deposited with a trust fund (avoiding costly searches). Others 
supported releasing samples from the scope of copyright altogether: ‘Some songs use 200 
samples just for the drum loops. The club music of the 1990s is based on infringements.’ 
 
 
(b) distribution 
When the prospect of ubiquitous digital connectivity appeared on the horizon with the release 
of Netscape in 1994, there was an expectation that artists would soon be able to reach a global 
Internet market without the help of intermediaries. Music and media arts which can be 
delivered entirely as strings of 0s and 1s, should have anticipated this trend, enabling niche 
consumption to flourish, and perhaps subverting winner-take-all markets. 
 
We find little evidence that this has happened. Bargaining power has remained firmly tilted 
towards intermediaries. Reasons include 
o the difficulty for individual aspiring artists of getting noticed among the ‘noise’ of 
creative ambitions 
o the reluctance of many artists to engage with alternative forms of copyright 
exploitation. 
 
A new generation of copyright laws predominantly concerned with preventing unauthorised 
distribution in digital networks through proprietary digital rights management (DRM) 
technologies has not helped (WIPO Internet Treaties 1996; DMCA 1998; EC Information 
Society Directive 2001).  
 
Recently, US based agencies for collective digital distribution aimed at independent labels and 
individual artists, such as the Independent Online Distribution Alliance 
("http://www.iodalliance.com"), Digital Rights Agency ("http://www.digitalrightsagency.com") 
or CD Baby ("http://www.cdbaby.com"), have attempted to change this. The performance of 
new royalty contracts on offer, such as CD Baby’s 91:9 split in favour of the artist, should be 
researched closely.  
 
 
Some interviewees thought self-publishing was not cost effective, taking up too much 
promotional effort in placing tracks. Most were willing to participate in on-line services (if they 
had not already signed away their on-line rights to publishers and labels). Rather than plunging 
radically into e-commerce, many artists seem to have become shrewder in exploiting 
strategically the royalty possibilities of the existing copyright system: for example producing 
works that are high on the collecting society valuation scale (Germany’s GEMA 
Wertungsverfahren), or making a succession of small deals for individual tracks. 
 
 
 
Non-Copyright Responses 
 
There are strong indications that a significant creative element of society no longer accepts the 
current structure of copyright, with long exclusive rights bundled in the hands of major right 
holders. 
 
o On the user side, we are familiar with the arguments from ever increasing ‘piracy’ rates 
on peer-to-peer file sharing networks (such as Napster pre-2000, or Kazaa). For example, 
participants in the 2000 MORI Study ‘Intellectual Property: Public Attitudes’ particularly 
resented restrictions on non-commercial use.  
 
o On the creator side, we find garage communities that mix or hide their sources, 
producing so-called bootleg records under artist identities such as Freelance Hellraiser, 
Frenchbloke, or Soulwax. Remixes from familiar copyright protected material may include 
combining Madonna with Telex, Kraftwerk with Witney Houston or Depeche Mode with 
Eminem. Recent controversy includes the Grey Album by DJ Dangermouse, mixing the 
Beatles’ White Album with Jay-Z’ Black Album (http://www.greytuesday.org/); 24 February 
2004).  
 
o Even intermediaries, such as metropolitan sub-culture radio stations or dance clubs now 
often operate outside the accepted frame of copyright laws. 
 
One interviewee accepted that pirate radio was ‘good promotion’, and that Ibiza clubs played 
his records for free. ‘If I am desperate for them to play my music, why should they pay me for 
it?’ As ‘secondary benefits’ of such unauthorised exposure, some artists named ‘further remix 
work’, or ‘DJ invitations’. 
 
Artistic motivations are complex, with some creators favouring wide distribution over the 
exclusive control promised by copyright law. This is in line with a questionnaire study of 
academic authors conducted by Gadd et al. (2003), and the growth of licences under the 
Creative Commons initiative. Others were happy with the exclusive structure of modern 
copyright, as they had learned to benefit from the system. 
 
 
 
Conclusions and future research 
 
Is there evidence of a break down of the barrier between creator and user?  
 
The answer is an unambiguous ‘Yes’ -- but much creative reworking takes place despite 
copyright barriers. Right owners’ terms remain very onerous, hindering engagement with 
contemporary cultural materials. 
 
 
Has digital distribution benefited creators financially?  
 
The evidence here is contradictory. The often made claim that copyright supports the creative 
basis of a society is empirically doubtful. There is a suspicion that copyright underpins vastly 
unequal rewards. 
 
Creator and investor interests are not the same. Copyright suits investors (music publishers, 
labels) who are incentivised to market and distribute the works they exclusively control. 
Copyright also suits creators with a track record of hits who can extract favourable terms from 
investors.  
 
Copyright does little for new and niche creators who often sign away their bargaining chips 
cheaply. In the absence of alternative compensation schemes, digitisation so far appears to have 
brought few financial benefits from disintermediated distribution. 
 
Royalties from performing rights administered by collecting societies (which cannot be 
individually renegotiated to reflect economic bargaining power) appear to form an important 
and increasing part of artists’ earnings. They appear to encourage artists at the margins of 
full-time work. 
 
A more systematic profile of creators’ income streams across diffent sectors and different legal 
frameworks (jurisdictions) would be highly desirable. Copyright contractual income (involving 
a transaction of rights); copyright non-contractual income (via collectively negotiated or 
statutory royalties administred by copyright societies), non-copyright contractual income (such 
as live performances or teaching) and income from non-artistic sources can be conceptually 
separated and captured by survey data and collecting society distributions.  
 
 
Cultural policy should be based on a clear empirical picture of the role of copyright in creative 
production. The questionnaire below is proposed as an empirical instrument that might fill this 
gap for the music sector, using UK terminology. 
 
 
Research agenda: analysis of music artists’ earnings 
 
Total income: 
 
1. Income from music: 
 1.1 Copyright: Non-contractual income 
  PRS: 
  MCPS: 
  PAMRA/PPL: 
  
 1.2 Copyright: Contractual income*  
  Studio work:   
  Record sales (apart from MCPS): 
  Own label: 
  Own publishing company: 
  
 1.3 Non Copyright: Contractual income   
  Live performances:  
  Grants/commissions: 
  Sponsorship/merchandising 
  Teaching: 
  Other (please specify): 
  
2. Income from non-music sources: 
  Family support: 
  Capital: 
  ‘day time job’: 
  Other (please specify): 
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Appendix 1: Monopoly & Mergers Commission (UK 1996): Performing Rights 
 
 
PRS income distribution in 1994 
 
Bands of net 
domestic distributed 
revenue* £ 
Number 
of writers 
% Cumulated 
% from top 
£m % Cumulated 
 % from top 
Up to 24 4,812 31.0 100.0 0.04 0.19 100.0 
25-49 1,624 10.5 69.0 0.06 0.29 99.8 
50-74 1,001 6.5 58.5 0.06 0.30 99.5 
75-99 800 5.2 52.0 0.07 0.34 99.2 
100-149 920 5.9 46.9 0.11 0.56 98.9 
150-199 632 4.1 40.9 0.11 0.54 98.3 
200-249 460 3.0 36.8 0.10 0.50 97.8 
250-499 1,481 9.6 33.9 0.53 2.6 97.3 
500-749 750 4.8 24.3 0.46 2.2 94.7 
750- 999 452 2.9 19.5 0.39 1.9 92.4 
1,000 – 2,499 1,130 7.3 16.6 1.79 8.8 90.5 
2,500 – 4,999 590 3.8 9.3 2.11 10.4 81.7 
5,000 – 9,999 389 2.5 5.5 2.75 13.5 71.4 
10,000 – 19,999 255 1.6 3.0 3.50 17.2 57.9 
20,000 – 49,999 164 1.1 1.3 4.98 24.5 40.7 
50,000 – 99,999 30 0.19 0.26 2.04 10.0 16.2 
100,000 and over 10 0.06 0.06 1.26 6.2 6.2 
       
Total 15,500 100.00 100.00 20.35 100.00 100.00 
 
                                                 
* Excluding earnings equalisation allowances, unlogged performance allocations, and revenue from preformance 
of films. 
Appendix 2: Künstlersozialkasse (Germany 2000) 
 
‘Künstlersozialkasse’ is a compulsory insurance for free-lancers, working in one of the four 
sectors  ‘Word’  (mostly journalists), ‘Visual Arts/Design’ (including the advertising industry), 
‘Music’ and ‘Performing Arts’ (e.g. actors, directors).  
 
 
Sector Music (1998) 
 
Sector of activity number of artists total income average income in 
DM 1,000 
Composer  3,717 81,144 21,830
Lyricist 234 6,297 26,910
Arranger 430 7,476 17,386
Conductor 265 7,380 27,849
Choirmaster 382 7,743 19,319
Instrumentalist Solo (E) 1,550 23,151 14,936
Orchestra Player (E) 507 7.251 14,302
Singer (opera, musical) 456 8,042 17,636
Singer (concert) 390 5,957 15,274
Choir 48 676 14,083
Folk music 1,564 28,634 18,308
Tanzmusik 2,552 40,662 15,933
Kurorchester 442 7,299 17,296
Jazz and Rock 2,634 36,255 13,764
Technical staff 474 9,148 19,299
Teacher 10,709 175,006 16,342
DJ 631 11,179 17,716
Others 963 14,000 14,538
 
Total 27,851 477,299 17,138
 
 
Number of musicians with an income in 1999 
 
below   DM     7,561:    1,451 
DM   7,561- DM     8,821:   3,123 
DM   8,821- DM   17,641: 12,969 
DM 17,641- DM   30,000:   6,228 
DM 30,000- DM   40,000:   1,604 
DM 40,000- DM   76,501:      909 
DM 76,501- DM 102,001:      136 
more than - DM 102,001:      125 
 
Total    26,545 
 
Appendix 3: Propositions for copyright law reform* 
 
Proposition 1:  
There is no unified category of right owners, covering creators (authors) and investors 
(producers). Creators have four main interests:  
 
- to see their work widely reproduced and distributed 
- to receive credit for it 
- to earn a financial reward relative to the commercial value of the work 
- to be able to engage creatively with other works (in adaptation, comment, 
sampling etc). 
 
Regarding the appropriate structure of author rights, this leads to three conclusions: 
 
The creator has little to gain from exclusivity (it prevents widest distribution; it 
prevents access to other works; it does not ensure financial reward) 
The creator has little to gain from transferability (under prevalent contractual 
practices, the creator can be bought out in a one-off commercial 
transaction) 
The creator has a lot to gain from the so-called droit moral (a kind of creative 
trade mark, ensuring integrity of origin). 
 
There are considerable economic inefficiencies caused by the costs of administrating rights.  
Digital technology offers new possibilities of tracing use and rewarding the creator. 
Transforming collecting societies into regulatory bodies answering to society at large (not only 
right owners) may be the best way forward. For one detailed proposal, see Fisher 2004. 
 
 
Proposition 2:  
Investors want exclusive and transferable property rights, to extract maximum returns from 
their investments. Exclusive rights, however, come at a cost to society.  
 
Useful works become more expensive than they would have been (this is a direct 
consumer loss). 
Works become available for creative engagements only on the terms of the right  
holder (this is a loss of cultural diversity, innovation and critique). 
Automatic returns from a backcatalogue of works subsidise existing large right 
holders, creating an entry barrier to the creative industries (this is an 
anti-competitive effect). 
 
Regarding the appropriate structure of copyright, this leads to one conclusion: 
 
Investors should be granted exclusive terms of protection only as a response to 
market failure: i.e. where without the incentive of exclusivity, a work in 
the ‘useful arts’ would not be produced at all. 
  
In the past, the exploitation cycle of cultural products already justifed only a short exclusive 
term. The faster digital dissemination and exploitation environment demands an even shorter 
exclusive term. Modern copyright laws in the tradition of Berne and TRIPS have got this 
radically wrong. 
                                                 
* These propositions were first advanced in my article ‘Digital Copyright: The end of an era’ (2003), European 
Intellectual Property Review 25/8: pp. 333-341. Star creators should be treated as investors. 
